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I.  Introduction 
In 2003 Gregory Nemitz sued NASA for infringing on his 
property rights by parking on “his” asteroid.1  He alleged that he 
was entitled to parking fees, citing his registration on the 
Archimedes Institute website of the asteroid in question.2  
Unsurprisingly, his case was dismissed.3  The court stated that his 
 
† J.D. Candidate 2019, University of North Carolina School of Law. Notes & Comments 
Editor, North Carolina Journal of International Law.  The author would like to thank her 
family, friends, and the journal staff for their support. 
 1 Complaint for Declaratory Judgement & Demand for Jury Trial at 12–13, Nemitz 
v. United States, No. CV–N030599–HDM–RAM, 2004 WL 3167042, at *1 (D. Nev. Apr. 
26, 2004). 
 2 Id. at 11–13. 
 3 Nemitz v. United States, No. CV–N030599–HDM–RAM, 2004 WL 3167042, at 
*2 (D. Nev. Apr. 26, 2004). 
2 N.C. J. INT'L L. [Vol. XLIV 
Fifth, Ninth, and Tenth Amendment claims all failed, because there 
are no “constitutionally protected property interest[s]” in outer 
space.4  Nemitz tried to argue that, because NASA had a declared 
purpose of facilitating “the fullest commercial use of space,” he 
should prevail.5  However, the court disagreed, stating that he could 
not prove the required “legal basis for his claim of a private property 
right on an asteroid.”6 
At the time, Nemitz’s claim seemed frivolous and almost 
laughable.  Now, however, it seems as though he will not be the first 
or the last person to sue over property rights, or any legal rights, for 
that matter, in space.  Since the space race of the 1950s, the global 
space industry has rapidly grown from a field reserved for 
technologically-advanced nations to one accessible to anyone who 
can pay.  By the early twenty-first century, nations began 
outsourcing national space programs to private companies, blurring 
the traditional distinction between “spacefaring” nations,7 such as 
the United States, Russia, China, and Europe (represented by the 
twenty-two-nation cooperative European Space Agency),8 and 
“non-spacefaring” states.9  The advent of commercial space 
companies, such as SpaceX and Virgin Galactic, have made the 
growth of space tourism possible. 
Each year, the United Nations General Assembly adopts a 
resolution entitled “International Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses 
of Outer Space,” which, while not legally binding, offers guidance 
to states on the conduct of space activities.10  With the 
commercialization of spaceflight, however, a more concrete set of 
laws is necessary to make the industry of space tourism as safe as 
possible.  The international community should look to the 
international maritime standards of safety as a guide for this 
 
 4 Id. at *1. 
 5 National Aeronautics and Space Act, 51 U.S.C. § 20102(c) (2012). 
 6 Nemitz, 2004 WL 3167042, at *1. 
 7 Claudia Pastorius, Law and Policy in the Global Space Industry’s Lift-Off, 19 
BARRY L. REV. 201, 204 (2013) [hereinafter Pastorius] (“Spacefaring nations are defined 
as those countries that have built rockets powerful enough for launches into space and have 
deployed their own satellites into orbit.”). 
 8 Id. 
 9 See id. at 206. 
 10 Space Law: Resolutions, U.N. OFF. FOR OUTER SPACE AFFS., (last visited Aug. 27, 
2018), http://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/spacelaw/resolutions.html 
[https://perma.cc/Q9VY-M5C5]. 
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process. 
This note will proceed as follows.  First, it will provide context 
and background on the need for safety standards in space.  Next, it 
will analyze the three main parallels to space law and explain why 
maritime law has the most applicable standards for safety.  Then, it 
will address various safety risks that have been highlighted by 
NASA and will conclude by suggesting modifications of the 
international maritime safety standards for application to space. 
A. Do We Really Need International Safety Standards for 
Space? 
In the twenty-first century, there has been a marked shift from 
State to non-State commercial actors in space.11  “Between 2012 and 
2013, commercial space products and services revenue grew 
7% . . . while government spending decreased by almost 2%.”12  In 
2010, NASA discontinued its human spaceflight program, and the 
United States moved to strengthen its private space industry.13  
Boeing, SpaceX, and Sierra Nevada have all been awarded contracts 
worth about $10 million dollars for services in space.14  SpaceX, 
headed by Elon Musk, was the first commercial company to launch 
and return a spacecraft from orbit and developed its spacecraft to 
provide cargo-resupply services to the International Space Station.15  
Virgin Galactic and Bigelow Airspace both offer luxury trips to 
space to private individuals willing to pay a substantial price.16 
With the space tourism industry slowly developing, it is 
necessary to acknowledge that there is no system of international 
safety regulation for private entities in space.  Under current 
international treaties, States are liable for any activity of their 
citizens in space, whether they are acting in a public or private 
capacity.17  This is unwise, as space tourism is clearly crossing 
 
 11 Paul S. Dempsey, National Laws Governing Commercial Space Activities: 
Legislation, Regulation, & Enforcement, 36 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 1, 3 (2016) (“Private-
sector commercial space activity is growing at a brisk pace, while governmental activity 
is declining.”). 
 12 Id. 
 13 Pastorius, supra note 7, at 206. 
 14 Id. at 211. 
 15 Benjamin Perlman, Grounding U.S. Commercial Space Regulation in the 
Constitution, 100 GEO. L.J. 929, 938–39 (2012). 
 16 The trips cost $200,000 and $25 million, respectively. Id. at 938. 
 17 See Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and 
4 N.C. J. INT'L L. [Vol. XLIV 
international lines.  It would be prudent to adopt worldwide 
standards providing, at the very least, basic guidelines for conduct 
of private actors in space. 
II. Background Law 
The first official treaty governing human conduct in outer space 
was the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in 
the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and 
Celestial Bodies,18 known colloquially as the “Outer Space Treaty.”  
The United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union were 
the three principal parties at the time of the treaty’s inception.19  The 
Outer Space Treaty facilitates cooperation between these three 
superpowers.20  It states that extraterrestrial exploration must be 
carried out “for the benefit and in the interests of all countries.”21  It 
further mandates the exclusive peaceful use of outer space and 
celestial bodies, barring any nation from stationing nuclear weapons 
or weapons of mass destruction in outer space.22 
The Outer Space Treaty repeatedly emphasizes the need to keep 
space free from domination by any one nation, military occupation 
or otherwise.  Article II explicitly bans any kind of “national 
appropriation” of space, the moon, or other celestial bodies.23  
Additionally, Article IV bars the construction of any kind of 
“military bases” in space.24  Article XII states that any station should 
be open to representatives of other State parties on the basis of 
reciprocity.25 
The Outer Space Treaty also deals with more technical issues 
such as jurisdiction in space. Under Article VIII, a State party that 
launches an object into outer space has jurisdiction over that object 
and any personnel inside it while in outer space or on a celestial 
 
Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies art. VII, Jan. 27, 1967, 
T.I.A.S. No. 6347, 18 U.S.T. 2410 [hereinafter Outer Space Treaty]. 
 18 Id. 
 19 Id. 
 20 S.G. Sreejith, Whither International Law, Thither Space Law: A Discipline in 
Transition, 38 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 331, 345 (2008). 
 21 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 17, art. I. 
 22 Id. art. IV. 
 23 Id. art. II. 
 24 Id. art. IV. 
 25 Id. art. XII. 
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body.26  Article VI states that parties “bear international 
responsibility for national activities in outer space,” regardless of 
whether or not the actor is public or private.27 
Article V of the Outer Space Treaty instructs nations to treat 
astronauts as “envoys of mankind” in outer space and requires that 
they provide to them “all possible assistance in the event of 
accident, distress, or emergency landing on the territory of another 
State Party.”28  The Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the 
Return of Astronauts, and the Return of Objects Launched into 
Outer Space (commonly known as “the Rescue Agreement”),29 
further elaborates on the treatment of astronauts in outer space.  The 
Rescue Agreement mandates that if a party discovers that a 
spacecraft has suffered an accident or is experiencing conditions of 
distress, the party must notify the launching authority of the 
secretary general of the UN30 in addition to taking any steps 
necessary to rescue the astronauts and rendering all necessary 
assistance.31 
Under the Outer Space Treaty, individual states retain liability 
for all activity in space by citizens of their country, whether or not 
the actor is public or private.32  Further information on regulation of 
objects in space is available in the Convention on Registration of 
Objects Launched into Outer Space.33  A “launching State” is 
defined as “a State which launches or procures the launching of a 
space object”34 or “a State from whose territory or facility a space 
object is launched.”35  A “space object” is defined as the 
“component parts of a space object” including “its launch vehicle 
 
 26 Id. art. VII. 
 27 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 17, art. VI. 
 28 Id. art. V. 
 29 G.A. Res. 2345 (XXII), annex, Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return 
of Astronauts, and the Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space (Dec. 19, 1967) 
[hereinafter Rescue Agreement]. 
 30 Id. art. I. 
 31 Id. art. II. 
 32 Dempsey, supra note 11, at 6. 
 33 G.A. Res. 3235 (XXIX), annex, Convention of Registration of Objects Launched 
into Outer Space (Nov. 12, 1974) [hereinafter Registration Convention]. 
 34 Id. art. I(a)(i). 
 35 Id. art. I(a)(ii). 
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and parts thereof.”36  States must create a registry of these objects,37 
and must inform the Secretary General of the UN once such a 
registry is established.38  When States record the launch of an object, 
they must report the name of the launching State, the “appropriate 
designator of the space object,” the date and territory of the launch, 
the basic orbital parameters, and the general function of the object.39 
Another treaty that may become more relevant as more nations 
become spacefaring is the Agreement Governing the Activities of 
States on the Moon and other Celestial Bodies, or “the Moon 
Treaty.”40  The Moon Treaty states that all activities carried out on 
the moon must adhere to international law and that the moon shall 
be used for only peaceful purposes.41  The Moon Treaty is similar 
to the Outer Space treaty in that it mandates that no nation can 
establish a military base on the moon, and prohibits the placement 
of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on the 
moon.42  However, there are several unique aspects of the Moon 
Treaty.  For example, States have a duty to report any scientific 
discovery on the moon to the United Nations.43  Nations are to treat 
the moon as part of the “common heritage of mankind” and cannot 
subject any part of the moon or its resources to national 
sovereignty.44  An interesting facet of this agreement is that States 
may take samples of minerals and other substances on the moon to 
be used for scientific purposes, and they are encouraged to share 
them with other nations upon request.45  The treaty also regulates 
the moon’s environment as States are not to disrupt the balance of 
the existing environment of the moon through contamination or 
other means.46 
The Rescue Agreement has the potential to be very important 
 
 36 Id. art. I(b). 
 37 Id. art. II. 
 38 Id. 
 39 Registration Convention, supra note 33, art. IV. 
 40 G.A. Res. 34/68, annex, Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the 
Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (Dec. 5, 1979) [hereinafter Moon Treaty]. 
 41 Id. art. 3. 
 42 Id. 
 43 Id. art. 5. 
 44 Id. art. 11. 
 45 Id. art. 6. 
 46 Moon Treaty, supra note 40, art. 7. 
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when there are accidents in space.47  Article I mandates that any 
contracting party must report to both the U.N. Secretary General 
and the launching authority when it has discovered a spacecraft 
from that launching authority that has suffered an accident, is 
“experiencing conditions of distress,” or has made an emergency 
landing in that nation’s territory or on the high seas.48  Contracting 
parties must also take steps to rescue the personnel of such a 
spacecraft,49 and return them promptly to the launching authority.50 
A growing number of States are becoming spacefaring nations, 
or nations that “have built rockets powerful enough for launches 
into space and have deployed their own satellites into orbit.”51  
Major spacefaring nations include Russia, the United States, France, 
China, Great Britain, India, Iran, North Korea, South Korea, and the 
joint program in the European Union.52  The Outer Space Treaty and 
the Registration Convention establish the specific records States 
must maintain in monitoring private entry into space.53  At least 
twenty-six States have enacted laws regulating space activity.54  The 
United States, for example, requires all private-sector participants 
in space flights, both passengers and crew members, to sign 
informed consent notifications stating that “the United States 
Government has not certified the launch vehicle as safe for carrying 
crew or space flight participants.”55  On the other hand, Australia 
requires licensees to “receive approval from local ambulance, fire, 
and police authorities prior to launching.”56  Australian licensees 
must also receive environmental approvals to ensure the launches 
do not compromise public health or safety, or cause damage to 
property.57  Additionally, the United States government requires 
organizations engaging in space flights to enter into reciprocal cross 
 
 47 Rescue Agreement, supra note 29. 
 48 Id. art. 1. 
 49 Id. art. 2. 
 50 Id. art. 4. 
 51 Pastorius, supra note 7, at 204. 
 52 Id. 
 53 See Dempsey, supra note 11, at 8 n.25. 
 54 Id. at 15—16. 
 55 Id. at 32. 
 56 Id. at 36. 
 57 Id. 
8 N.C. J. INT'L L. [Vol. XLIV 
waivers with its contractors, subcontractors, and customers.58  In 
Russia, another major spacefaring nation, a license is required for 
all space activities by “all legal and natural persons of the Russian 
Federation” and operations of “foreign citizens and organizations 
operating under Russian Jurisdiction.”59 
III. Maritime Law as a Model for Space Law 
While many successful space missions have been launched over 
the past half-century, space flight is not without risks.  The United 
States has experienced its share of near misses and tragedies.  When 
Neil Armstrong landed Apollo 11 on the moon, he had “less than 30 
seconds worth of fuel remaining.”60  Apollo 12 was struck by 
lightning, which momentarily shut down electric power on the 
capsule.61  An oxygen tank ruptured during the Apollo 13 mission 
to the moon, and fourteen NASA crew members lost their lives in 
the Challenger and Colombia space shuttles.62  Other national space 
programs have suffered similar tragedies.63  However, the unique 
difficulties with space travel greatly limit rescue options.64 
As of right now, many nations, including the United States, do 
not have any clear cut commercial safety standards for space.  
Because of the lack of coherent international guidelines on how 
exactly States should structure safety standards for commercial 
space regulation, States vary widely in their choices to regulate 
commercial spaceflight.  For example, in the United States, 
Congress put a moratorium on promulgation of regulations 
protecting the health and safety of the crew unless they related to 
serious or fatal injury.65  While this may appear counterintuitive, 
Congress enacted this moratorium in an effort to promote the 
development of space operation programs within the private 
 
 58 Id. at 32. 
 59 Dempsey, supra note 11, at 27. 
 60 HEALTH STANDARDS FOR LONG DURATION AND EXPLORATION SPACEFLIGHT: 
ETHICS PRINCIPLES, RESPONSIBILITIES, AND DECISION FRAMEWORK 46 (Jeffrey Kahn et. al. 
eds., 2014) [hereinafter HEALTH STANDARDS FOR SPACEFLIGHT]. 
 61 Id. 
 62 Id. 
 63 See, e.g., Alexey Timofeychev, The dark side of the Soviet space program: 3 tragic 
accidents, RUSSIA BEYOND (Jan. 29, 2018), https://www.rbth.com/science-and-
tech/327410-dark-side-of-space-program [https://perma.cc/MAU2-MAY8]. 
 64 HEALTH STANDARDS FOR SPACEFLIGHT, supra note 60, at 46. 
 65 Dempsey, supra note 11, at 32. 
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sector.66  This may be fine for a nation as technologically advanced 
as the United States, but not every nation has the same capabilities 
and access to technology. 
Additionally, technical qualifications of commercial spaceflight 
operators and licensing procedures differ across the globe.67  
Increasingly, States are mandating licenses prior to any space 
activity.68  However, the Outer Space Treaty does not provide any 
guidance as to how to structure domestic law, so licensing is at each 
State’s discretion.69  Some States focus on the ability to finance the 
proper level of insurance, while others look at technical 
qualifications.70 
Three main parallels have been drawn to space law: “air law, 
law of the sea, and the Antarctic Treaty.”71  The unifying theme 
amongst these three “is that all regulate areas which have somewhat 
anomalous physical features.”72  From a purely physical standpoint, 
Antarctica is the most geographically similar to outer space.73  
However, of these three fields of law, maritime law has the most 
comprehensive international standards for vessels to promote 
maximum safety and minimize pollution.74  These laws should be 
used as a model for constructing international outer space safety 
standards. 
The Antarctic Treaty was meant to serve as a prototype for 
future covenants regulating outer space.75  Antarctica and outer 
space are similar in terms of geographic and natural resource 
 
 66 Id. 
 67 See id. at 19. 
 68 Id. 
 69 See id. at 14—15. 
 70 See id. at 28–29. For example, in South Korea, licenses are denied if applicants are 
bankrupt. Id. at 29. Alternatively, in Russia, applicants must demonstrate sufficient 
technical knowledge of the matter. Id. at 30. 
 71 Sreejith, supra note 20, at 364. 
 72 Id. 
 73 See id. at 365. 
 74 See generally The Principal Regulations Governing Maritime Safety, INT’L 
CHAMBER OF SHIPPING (2017) (U.K.), http://www.ics-shipping.org/shipping-facts/safety-
and-regulation/the-principal-regulations-governing-maritime-safety 
[https://perma.cc/2ZDH-BEY2] (establishing the multiple regulations on maritime safety 
and pollution that have been adopted by the International Maritime Organization). 
 75 Sreejith, supra note 20, at 364. 
10 N.C. J. INT'L L. [Vol. XLIV 
accessibility.76  Additionally, like outer space, there is a lack of 
power belonging to any one State in Antarctica—though seven 
nations have made territorial claims of some sort, not all countries 
recognize them.77   The continent is governed by the Antarctic 
Treaty system, a regulatory framework developed by the various 
Party States to the Antarctic Treaty.78  This system bears many 
similarities to the rules for space which are established by the Outer 
Space Treaty.79  For example, the Antarctic must be used for only 
peaceful purposes, weapons testing is prohibited, and military 
personnel and equipment are only allowed to the extent that they 
will be used for scientific research or peaceful purposes.80  The 
treaty further states that no territorial claims may be asserted by any 
nation, and it gives States jurisdiction over their own personnel in 
Antarctica.81 
While there are clearly many parallels between space law and 
Antarctic law, there are aspects of maritime law that make it more 
useful to space law as humans move towards the commercialization 
of outer space.  For example, resource mining and tourism are two 
areas where the law of the sea may have more applicability to space 
law.  The only real resource in Antarctica that has been exploited is 
fish, and tourism is sparse.  In order to regulate tourism and trade in 
space, the international community could potentially look to the law 
of the sea. 
Under current international law, the sea is divided into three 
zones: inland waters, territorial waters near coastlines, and the high 
 
 76 Id. at 365. 
 77 Antarctica, THE CIA WORLD FACTBOOK (2017), 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ay.html 
[https://perma.cc/DN73-RLN5]. 
 78 Id. The Antarctic Treaty system is comprised of the Antarctic Treaty, Dec. 1, 1959, 
12 U.S.T. 794, 402 U.N.T.S. 71, the Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine 
Living Resources, May 20, 1980, 33 U.S.T. 3476, 1329 U.N.T.S. 48, the Convention for 
the Conservation of Antarctic Seals, June 1, 1972, 29 U.S.T. 441, 11 I.L.M. 251, the 
Protocol on Environmental Protection of the Antarctic Treaty, Jan. 14, 1998, 30 I.L.M. 
1455, as well as numerous recommendations and measures adopted by participating States 
at annual Antarctic Treaty consultative meetings. See The Antarctic Treaty System, SCI. 
COMMITTEE ON ANTARCTIC RES. (last visited Aug. 27, 2018), 
https://www.scar.org/policy/antarctic-treaty-system/ [https://perma.cc/CMB9-ZRMQ], 
for further reading on the Antarctic Treaty system. 
 79 Antarctica, supra note 77. 
 80 Antarctic Treaty, supra note 78, at art. I. 
 81 Id. 
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seas—the area most analogized to airspace and traditionally thought 
of as outside the jurisdiction of any nation.82  The International 
Maritime Organization, located in London, has adopted several 
international shipping conventions regulating the high seas, 
including SOLAS (International Convention for the Safety of Life 
at Sea), MARPOL (International Convention for the Prevention of 
Pollution from Ships), COLREG (Convention on the International 
Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea), STCW (International 
Convention on Standards of Training, Certification, and 
Watchkeeping for Seafarers), and the ISM (International Safety 
Management Code).83 
The International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, or 
SOLAS, was first adopted in 1914.84  The most recent version was 
adopted in 1980.85  SOLA’s main objective is “to specify minimum 
standards for the construction, equipment and operation of ships, 
compatible with their safety.”86  Flag States must make sure that 
vessels operating under their flag comply with safety requirements, 
but any contracting government may inspect the ships of any other 
contracting government if there are “clear grounds for believing that 
the ship and its equipment do not substantially comply with the 
requirements of the Convention.”87  Other important provisions 
concern the construction requirements of both passenger and cargo 
ships, fire safety measures, lifesaving appliances and their 
arrangements, and various navigation features to ensure safety.88  
All of these provisions could be adjusted so as to accommodate the 
unique concerns of space and serve as models for a similar 
agreement regulating space. 
The Convention on the International Regulations for Preventing 
Collisions at Sea, or COLREG, was adopted in 1972.89  COLREG 
 
 82 Nancy L. Firak & Kimberly A. Schmaltz, Air Range: Choice of Law for 
International Torts Occurring in Flight Over International Waters, 63 ALB. L. REV. 1, 38 
(1999). 
 83 The Principal Regulations Governing Maritime Safety, supra note 74. 
 84 International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, Nov. 1, 1974, 1184 
U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter SOLAS]. 
 85 Id. 
 86 Id. 
 87 Id. 
 88 Id. 
 89 International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, Oct. 20, 1972, 28 
U.S.T. 3459, 1050 U.N.T.S. 16 [hereinafter COLREGs]. 
12 N.C. J. INT'L L. [Vol. XLIV 
creates traffic schemes for the seas, including safe speed 
recommendations, visibility requirements, conduct of vessels when 
approaching each other, light requirements, and sounds and 
signals.90  While some of these provisions may seem ill-suited to 
governing space travel, it is still wise to adopt some kind of 
universal system of traffic patterns for vehicles during launch and 
while in orbit. 
The International Convention on Standards of Training, 
Certification, and Watchkeeping for Seafarers, or STCW, was 
adopted to “promote safety of life and property at sea and the 
protection of the marine environment by establishing in common 
agreement international standards of training, certification and 
watchkeeping for seafarers.”91  These standards were revised in 
2010, and cover everything from character and fitness to 
technology-related requirements.92  It is important to offer some sort 
of mandatory system credentialing when it comes to space flight, as 
the requirements vary substantially from nation to nation. 
Finally, the International Convention for the Prevention of 
Pollution from Ships (MARPOL) could serve as a model for 
preventing pollution by spacecraft.93  MARPOL focuses primarily 
on oil and the discharge of noxious liquid and sewage, which are 
less of a concern in space law.94 However, these provisions could be 
amended to accommodate the unique pollution concerns that come 
with space, such as free-floating debris from discarded material and 
light pollution. 
IV. What Safety Concerns Must be Accommodated? 
According to NASA, spaceflight involves “a high degree of 
known risks” as well as “uncertain and unforeseeable risks.”95  
These risks exist during all phases of any mission, though launch is 
identified as the riskiest period.96  Short-term health consequences 
 
 90 Id. 
 91 International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification, and 
Watchkeeping for Seafarers, July 7, 1978, 1361 U.N.T.S. 2 [hereinafter STCW]. 
 92 Id. 
 93 International Maritime Organization, International Convention on the Prevention 
of Pollution from Ships, Feb. 17, 1973, 1340 U.N.T.S. 184 [hereinafter MARPOL]. 
 94 Id. 
 95 Health Standards for Spaceflight, supra note 60, at 25. 
 96 Id. 
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of space travel include nausea, fatigue from acute radiation 
exposure, injury, and blurred vision.97  Long-term consequences 
include radiation-induced cancers and loss of bone mass.98  NASA 
has divided space health risks into five categories: (1) behavioral 
health and performance; (2) human health countermeasures 
(including bone metabolism, physiology, nutrition, immunology, 
cardiac and pulmonary physiology, and injury); (3) space radiation; 
(4) space human factors and habitability; and (5) exploration 
medical capabilities.99 
NASA has grouped its current human spaceflight safety 
standards into three categories: (1) fitness for duty standards; (2) 
space permissible exposure limits (which set ceilings on risk 
exposures during missions); and (3) permissible outcome limits 
(which give guidelines as to acceptable maximum decrease or 
change in biology and physiology).100  Reviews of these health 
standards are conducted every five years.101  Additionally, there are 
high standards for astronaut selection.102  While the commercial 
spaceflight industry need not be concerned with the long-term 
effects of outer space on the human body, the international 
community should take steps to implement regulations to minimize 
the short-term effects of exposure to outer space. 
A risk NASA has identified that could impact both private and 
governmental spaceflight is vision impairment.103  Astronauts have 
long reported vision changes during spaceflight, but until recently, 
these changes were assumed to be transient and isolated.104  There 
have been documented reports of astronauts who spend more time 
in space becoming more farsighted.105  There are several hypotheses 
to explain this, including elevated carbon dioxide in the space and 
 
 97 Id. 
 98 Id. There are obviously more long-term physical consequences of space travel, but 
few with comprehensive bodies of research. 
 99 Id. at 29. 
 100 Id. at 33–34. 
 101 Health Standards for Spaceflight, supra note 60, at 38. 
 102 Id. at 39–40. These standards include vision that is or is correctable to 20/20 in 
both eyes and blood pressure below 140/90, among others. 
 103 Id. at 47. 
 104 Id. 
 105 Id. 
14 N.C. J. INT'L L. [Vol. XLIV 
radiation exposure.106  There is also evidence that the same 
processes may cause intracranial pressure.107  This is an area in 
which NASA identified international parameters as “lacking.”108 
The international community should also consider creating 
standards for commercial space flight for bone demineralization due 
to exposure to microgravity109 and radiation exposure.110  The first 
is a “well-studied phenomenon,” yet scientists are still unsure “in 
what ways microgravity-induced bone loss might be similar to, or 
different from, osteoporosis.”111   Radiation exposure has both acute 
immediate and long-term secondary risks. Immediate effects 
include fatigue, nausea, and vomiting.112  Long-term effects of 
chronic exposure to radiation include an increase in the risk of 
cancer, tissue degeneration, development of cataracts, and adverse 
effects on the central nervous system, cardiovascular system, 
immune function, and vision.113 
V. Reforming Space Law as Guided by Maritime Law 
The international community is aware that there must be some 
kind of international entity or agreement to regulate commercial 
space exploration.114  Some have suggested that the International 
Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) serve as a model.115  The ICAO 
is “a technical organization with a central role in establishing 
international standards and practices, collecting statistics, and 
overseeing all the non-economic aspects” of commercial aviation.116  
The ICAO works to create multilateral approaches to international 
airspace regulation.117  An advantage to following a multilateral 
approach is that the area of nations that actually have access to 
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spaceflight is relatively small, so there would be fewer parties 
advocating for their particular interests.118  Additionally, bilateral 
agreements on technical standards and safety issues have generally 
garnered a lot of support.119 
Others have suggested that—instead of creating a separate 
parallel organization for international spaceflight regulations—the 
ICAO should be expanded to include space flight.120  This would be 
a less-difficult process, as the ICAO already has 191 members and 
decades of experience.121  However, the ICAO has very little space 
expertise and very few member States of the ICAO are spacefaring 
nations.122  Regardless of what organization creates the agreement, 
it is clear there must be international standards in place to make 
commercial space use as risk free as possible. 
A. Structural Requirements to Guarantee Astronaut Safety 
At a base level, the best way to begin the process of 
implementing safety standards would be using SOLAS as a model 
for safety requirements of commercial spacecraft vehicles.  
Chapter I of SOLAS includes general provisions,123 including a 
regulation permitting one country to survey another country’s ship 
for safety purposes.124  This regulation should be adapted to space 
law at some point, especially in situations outlined in the Rescue 
Agreement where one party is returning the astronauts or property 
of another.125  It might be too controversial to implement while the 
space industry is still incipient, as nations are very secretive about 
the development of spacecraft.  However, if the commercial space 
industry reaches the point where space tourism and commercial 
space travel are the norm, it would be wise to adopt such a principle. 
Chapter II-1 of SOLAS requires passenger ships to maintain 
watertight compartments that maintain the stability of the ship’s hull 
after assumed damage.126  To accommodate space travel, these 
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provisions could be adopted to mandate that ships be airtight, not 
watertight.  Additionally, under SOLAS, passenger ships have the 
most stringent standards for maintaining a watertight structure,127 
undoubtedly because non-crew passengers on marine vessels are 
there for transport or pleasure.  In the context of space travel, there 
does not need to be a distinction between crew and non-crew 
passengers.  Space travel is equally risky for crewmembers and 
passengers alike.  Requiring that all ships be airtight will hopefully 
address scientists’ concerns about radiation damage as well as make 
spacecraft safer overall. 
Any standards of safety in outer space should also adopt 
Regulation 25(a) of Chapter II-1,128 which requires that all ships 
have an emergency source of power “to ensure . . . that a fire or 
other casualty to the machinery space . . . will not interfere with the 
supply or distribution of emergency power.”129  This regulation 
might need to be expanded if adapted to space, with special 
provisions for which systems an emergency energy source must 
continue to power.130 
SOLAS Chapter VIII, which deals with nuclear ships, should 
also be used as a model for safety regulations in space.131  SOLAS 
defines a nuclear ship as “a ship provided with a nuclear power 
plant.”132  Scientists have identified radiation exposure as both a 
short and long-term risk of space travel;133 therefore, this chapter is 
important for building the foundation of international safety 
standards in space.  Regulation 6 of Chapter VIII134 requires that 
there be “measures to ensure that there are no unreasonable 
radiation or other nuclear hazards” to the passengers or the public.135  
This regulation could be modified to fit outer space by drafting a 
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provision that allows for a maximum amount of radiation a 
passenger may be exposed to on a spacecraft. 
B. Licensing and Training Requirements to Insure Safety 
In addition to creating structural requirements to guarantee the 
safety of astronauts, any kind of international regime to ensure 
safety in space should include some kind of universally-applicable 
licensing requirements.  Right now, nations vary greatly in the kind 
of certification they require for astronauts and those who launch 
shuttles.136  These types of regulations had a similar start in maritime 
law.  Initially, individual governments created certification ratings 
and standards, without referencing other nations’ practices.137  Due 
to the wide variety in certification standards stemming from these 
disparities, the International Convention on Standards of Training, 
Certification, and Watchkeeping for Seafarers (STCW) was 
introduced in 1978.138  “The [STCW provides] minimum standards 
[ . . . ] for training and certification [ . . . ] which countries must 
either meet or exceed.”139 
Unlike other conventions promulgated by the IMO, “[p]arties 
[ . . . ] are required to provide detailed [proof of] compliance with 
the convention,” including “education and training courses, 
certification procedures, and [any] other factor relevant to 
implementing the convention.”140  Any similar regulation scheme in 
space should mimic this measure, especially since these standards 
might change where space is concerned as research is constantly 
bringing new hurdles and complications of space travel to light. 
The STCW lays out certain mandatory requirements of 
certification, such as being eighteen years of age and having at least 
one year of training.141  There are different levels of required 
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certification, depending on the size of the load the ship is carrying.142  
While space law safety standards should include mandatory 
requirements of certification, because of the inherent danger of 
space travel, it may be wiser to distinguish between passengers and 
crew members, rather than requiring different levels of certification 
for different crew members.  This way, in case of an emergency, 
any crew member will be able to assist another.  Another aspect of 
the STCW that will need to be modified to accommodate space 
travel is the age requirement.  The STCW provides for crew 
members as young as sixteen working in certain areas, so long as 
they are certified.143  Any regulations dealing with space should 
probably impose a higher age limit until space travel is more 
developed. 
The STCW also provides for certain requirements on hours of 
work and rest, and as of 2010, provisions for the prevention of drug 
and alcohol abuse.144  The convention requires “a minimum of 10 
hours of rest in any 24-hour period,” except in cases of 
emergency.145  The rest period may be divided into no more than 
two parts, one of which must be at least six hours.146  While any 
provisions on drug and alcohol abuse should be limited to the 
preflight period,147  there should surely be some kind of international 
standard on hours astronauts are required to rest after working, as 
some nations are more likely than others to expect astronauts to 
forgo sleep in favor of conducting more research. 
C. Preventing Pollution and Making Space Safe for Everyone 
Else 
The most-difficult maritime convention to adapt to outer space 
is likely the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution 
from Ships (MARPOL).148  MARPOL focuses primarily on 
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preventing pollution from “harmful substances,” primarily oil or 
noxious liquids.149   A “harmful substance” under Article 2 is any 
substance that, when introduced into the sea “is liable to create 
hazards to human health, to harm living resources and marine life, 
to damage amenities or to interfere with other legitimate uses of the 
sea.”150  The sea is fundamentally different from space in this 
respect, as there is no human habitat or extraterrestrial life (that we 
know of) to worry about damaging.  Additionally, oil and noxious 
liquids are not particularly hazardous to ships in outer space. 
Nevertheless, some pollution in space does need to be monitored 
and reduced.  As more nations move into space, floating space 
debris are becoming a pressing technical issue.151  “Space debris” 
include defunct satellites, booster parts, and bits of metal and 
scrap.152  In 2013, NASA reported over 500,000 trackable pieces of 
space debris in orbit.153  Provisions of MARPOL that could be 
modified to accommodate space are Articles 7 and 8, which require 
“all possible efforts shall be made to avoid a ship being unduly 
delayed or detained,”154 and for “a report of an incident without 
delay” after an incident involving harmful substances.155  Spacecraft 
could have a duty to report the sighting of space debris to an 
international body, and ensure that other vessels are aware when 
they eject such debris. 
VI. Conclusion and Recommendations 
While the global space industry is still in its infancy, there is no 
doubt that it will continue to grow in the coming years.  There is a 
myriad of opportunities in outer space to help those on Earth, from 
mining resources on the moon156 to preemptively detecting human 
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rights violations from space.157  Furthermore, the shift from 
government-sponsored space programs to commercial space 
programs allows more parties a chance to take advantage of these 
resources. 
However, as befits a major industry, there must be some kind of 
international safety standards regulating commercial spacecraft.  
The current practice of allowing each government to promulgate its 
own safety and certification procedures will simply not do—space 
travel is too unique and dangerous.  Space law should take its cues 
from maritime law, and provide comprehensive regulations on the 
structure of spacecraft, parameters for licensing, and waste 
monitoring.  By adopting an approach focused on cooperation and 
safety, the global space industry can plot a successful course toward 
a bright future. 
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